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ABSTRACT 
A Hegelianized version of Althusser’s concept of problematic is used to investigate the underlying 
theoretical unity and structure of Arabic physical science (physics, astronomy and chemistry). A 
contradictory triad (associated with Platonism, Aristotelianism and Ptolemaism) is identified at the 
heart of the Arabic project for physical science. This article focuses on the valiant attempts made by 
leading Arabic scientists to overcome these contradictions without transcending or tearing apart the 
prevailing problematic. The following question is then addressed: why was Arabic physical science 
reformist, rather than revolutionary, unlike Renaissance European physical science? An answer is 
proposed in terms of the history, nature and decline of Arabic rationalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
My investigations into modern physical theories and their interconnections and mechanisms 
of development have led me to the idea that the principal mechanism of progress in modern 
physical theory is a process of unification which dialectically resolves contradictions inherent 
in the heart of physical theory. Such a process drives physical theory beyond its own 
structure of  premises  and  meaning;  it  is  a  process of transcendence 1, 2. 
However, these investigations have also shown that there is always an alternative route of 
development, which tends  to “resolve”  contradictions  within the existing structure and 
without  transcending it. This route fails to effect major progressive breakthroughs and to 
open new research avenues, even though it may involve highly sophisticated and clever 
mathematical ploys and innovative tricks. 
I call the former route the revolutionary route, and the latter route the conservative  route. 
The model example which embodies this idea is the events at the end of the nineteenth 
century which led to the theory of special relativity. The principal contradiction at the heart 
of physical theory then was the multi-faceted contradiction between Newtonian Mechanics 
and Maxwellian Electromagnetism. The conservative route was followed by Lorentz, who 
“resolved” many aspects of this contradiction, using very sophisticated mathematical 
techniques, but without transcending the basic structure of Classical Physics epitomized by 
such  notions  as  the  ether, absolute space, absolute time, and absolute  mass  3, 4. 
Of course, the revolutionary route was followed by Einstein in his 1905 relativity and photon 
papers. Right from the start, from the very first page of his 1905 relativity paper, Einstein 
declared his intention to resolve certain “asymmetries” by dispensing with the age-old 
concept of ether and radically re-examining the concepts of absolute simultaneity and 
absolute space. This led him to replace these fundamental concepts with the generalized 
principle of special relativity and the amazing principle of the constancy of  the speed of 
light in vacuo  5. 
We all know where Lorentz’s conservative route has led physics (to nowhere) and where 
Einstein’s revolutionary route has led it: to General Relativity, Particle Physics, Modern 
Cosmology, and the whole of modern physics 6, 7. 
In this paper, I intend to show the efficacy of this idea of development of physical theory in 
understanding the nature of Arabic physical science, particularly Arabic astronomy, in 
contrast with Copernican astronomy and the ensuing developments in European science. 
Focusing on the Arabic critique of Ptolemy and the alternative astronomical models 
envisaged by various  Arabic  astronomers, I  argue  that Arabic scientists tended to follow 
the conservative route in resolving the contradictions of Greek physical science, whereas 
Copernicus (and later, Kepler) followed the revolutionary route . In both cases, physics was 
used as a guide to criticize Ptolemy and develop alternative models. However, whereas 
Arabic scientists closely followed Aristotelian physics, Copernicus and Kepler openly defied 
Aristotelian physics and were beginning to feel their way through a new field, physics 8. 
However to fully appreciate this characterization, and the nature of innovation  in  Arabic 
astronomy,  I  shall use the Althusserian notion of problematic as a textual tool. However, I 
find this tool, in its original Althusserian from, too rigid to theorize developmental patterns 
in scientific theory. I, thus, introduce certain “Hegelianized” modifications to it, which 
imbue it with noticeable explanatory power. H. Ghassib 
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Finally, I find it necessary to emphasize, right from the start, that the two routes do not 
grow separately, and in relative isolation from each other. On the contrary, they are 
inextricably tied to each other. In particular, the revolutionary route is usually unimaginable 
without the conservative route. Was Einstein imaginable without the conservative Lorentz 
and the semi-conservative Poincaré? Similarly, was Copernicus imaginable without 
Al-Zarqali, Al-Bitruji, Ibn Al-Haitham, Al-Urdi, Tusi and Ibn Shatir, amongst others ? 
LOUIS ALTHUSSER 
Louis Althusser 9-11 is a French philosopher, who died in1990. He is usually characterized 
as a structuralist Marxist philosopher. During the sixties and seventies of the pervious 
century, he was at the heart of a fierce ideological struggle in French and European left-wing 
circles. However, with the changed circumstances, and the accompanying retreat of the left 
worldwide, in the last thirty years, Althusser has suffered an almost total eclipse and been 
consigned to almost total oblivion. Nevertheless, his influence is still noticeable in cultural 
studies, particularly after the publication and translation of many hitherto unpublished 
manuscripts in the last few years 12. Notwithstanding his ideological and political eclipse, I 
think that quite a few of his notions could be very effective and useful in understanding 
historical texts and events, particularly in the sciences. I proclaim Althusser’s philosophy as 
truly pertinent to deepening our understanding of the dialectic of unity and disunity in the 
history of science. In particular, I deem Althusser’s notion of “problematic” to be an essential 
notion for understanding the unity of Graeco-Arabic physical science vis-à-vis developments 
in the modern era. 
I shall, therefore, explain this notion as a prelude to applying it to Arabic physical science in 
relation to the Copernican Revolution. 
THE NOTION OF PROBLEMATIC 
Althusser avers, right at the start of his intellectual career, that the essence of a text does not 
lie in its object. Nor does it lie in the individual isolated concepts it employs. Rather, it lies in 
its problematic. The fundamental basis of a text is its problematic 13, 14 rather than its 
basic individual concepts. Basically, a problematic is a structured conceptual hierarchy which 
animates a text and produces its meaning. It is the structural condition of the possibility of 
meaning of a text. It defines its semantic space. A concept does not acquire its meaning from 
its logical structure. Nor does it acquire it from a direct relationship to an object outside it. 
Rather, it does so from its problematic and through it. Even its relationship to its object is 
established via its problematic. 
In fact, Althusser arrived at this notion of problematic by comparing four sets of 
philosophical texts: Hegel’s, Feuerbach’s, the Early Marx’s and the Mature Marx’s. He 
noticed that, ultimately, the first three sets shared the same problematic, even though they 
appeared diametrically different. For, even though Feuerbach had inverted Hegel, he had 
retained the basic underlying Hegelian problematic. Thus, the materialist Feuerbach remained 
a prisoner of the idealist Hegelian semantic space. Also, even though the Young Marx had 
been concerned with politics and political economy, whereas Feuerbach had been concerned 
with religion, theology and speculative philosophy, they both shared the same problematic – 
or, to be more precise, the Young Marx had borrowed Feuerbach’s problematic, and applied 
it to different objects. Thus, the notion of problematic helps us to detect basic differences and 
similarities, and to delve deeply into the heart of a text, behind a fascade of illusory 
appearances. Apparent breaks are recognized for what they truly are – mere variations on a 
theme. On the other hand, surface appearances and identities turn out to conceal radical On the theoretical problematic of Arabic physical science or why did Arabic science ... 
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breaks and departures. In this respect, the notion of problematic could be used to assess 
intellectual achievements and their degree of originality. 
Althusser also used this important notion to define intellectual revolutions. As long as a text 
remains tied to the existing problematic, it does not constitute an intellectual revolution, no 
matter how hard it tries to disguise the problematic with seemingly new concepts, and to 
invert structures without changing their internal relations. Thus, neither Feuerbach nor the 
Young Marx constituted an intellectual revolution in philosophy, particularly vis-à-vis Hegel. 
On the other hand, the Mature Marx did indeed achieve a radical intellectual revolution, 
because he succeeded in effecting a so-called epistemological break whereby he broke loose 
from the Hegelian-Feuerbachian ideological problematic and moved to a new scientific 
problematic epitomized most conspicuously by Das Kapital. Thus, intellectual revolutions are 
basically epistemological breaks whereby a thinker jumps from one problematic to an 
altogether different problematic. 
A HEGELIANIZED VERSION OF PROBLEMATICS 
The moment one tries to apply Althusser’s notion of problematic to the history of physical 
theory, one encounters numerous difficulties related to the obvious rigidity of this notion. 
Althusser’s problematic is indeed too rigid to explain mutations, transitions and movement in 
physical theory. In fact, it is a closed universe, a monad, with no mechanisms connecting it to 
other problematics. 
Each problematic is almost self-sufficient, coherent and homogeneous. The way out of this 
impasse for Althusser is the notion of epistemological break – a quantum leap in the dark 
with no clear mechanism; a blind irrational jump. 
The way out to salvage this important notion is to modify it by introducing Hegelian elements 
in it – in particular, a degree of inhomogeneity and dialectical contradiction. With this 
modification, a problematic is transformed from a closed static totality into an open dynamic 
totality that moves forward and mutates under the pressure of its internal contradictions. The 
state of inhomogeneity in a problematic normally arises from an amalgamation or 
coalescence of problematics – i.e., from the fact that actual historically constituted 
problematics are hybrids. This also makes a problematic not indifferent to its object, as 
Althusser seems to imply. On the contrary, a problematic develops and accentuates its 
contradictions by interacting with its object, until a point is reached where the resolution of 
these contradictions demands the transcendence of the problematic. Te be more precise, this 
resolution transforms the existing problematic into a new higher one. 
It is this Hegelianized version of the notion of problematic that I shall now use to explore the 
nature and significance of Arabic physical Science. 
THE PROBLEMATIC OF GREEK AND ARABIC PHYSICAL SCIENCE 
Arabic physical science spans a period of seven continuous centuries, from A.D. 800 to 
A.D. 1500 15, 16. It was indeed a period brimming with innovation and scientific activity. 
Yet, underlying all this amazing variety of ideas and theories, there was a constant, 
essentially unchanging, problematic. If one compares a 9
th century text with a 14
th century 
text, one does not fail to notice this constancy in problematic. One, of course, finds it hard to 
account for this constancy, in view of the many critical spirits that animated Arabic physical 
science. H. Ghassib 
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How would one characterize the problematic of Arabic Science? Clearly, it was basically a 
Greek problematic. Arabic physical Science was principally a creative continuation of Greek 
physical Science. In particular, it was an amalgam of three “pure” problematics – Plato’s, 
Aristotle’s and Ptolemy’s. They are three inter–related, but distinct, pure problematics. 
Plato’s problematic, as revealed in the Timaeus 17, revolves around the idea that the 
Universe is a unique, self–contained, self-sufficient and rational being, endowed with perfect 
traits and features, such as a spherical shape and components revolving around its centre with 
uniform circular motion. The latter traits became a cornerstone of physical science, 
astronomy and cosmology in Antiquity. It was deeply incorporated in the Aristotelian 
problematic 18. The latter was based on the idea that the Universe is a semi-material, finite, 
inhomogeneous, mechanical system with a well-defined physical centre, that acts as a 
gathering and attractive place for heavy elements (earth and water). This spherical system 
knows no outside and no vacuum. It consists of two distinct and qualitatively different 
realms: the terrestrial and the celestial. The former is characterized by change, corruption, 
birth, death, straight- line motion and a combination of four basic elements (earth, water, air 
and fire), and is described by Aristotelian Physics. The latter is characterized by sphericity, 
uniform circular motion, and an eternally unchanging substance or element (ether). Space is a 
mere attribute of matter, and time is endless. The planets and stars are carried by revolving 
spheres made of transparent ether. There is a prime unmoved mover that envelopes the whole 
Universe and imparts motion to the various concentric spheres 19. 
Ptolemy later developed a mathematical problematic, based on work done previously by 
Appollonius, Hipparchus and the Babylonians 20. He employed such geometrodynamic 
concepts as the eccentric, deferent, epicycle and equant. In fact, as an astronomer seeking to 
describe and “explain” data and measurements, he was truly revolutionary in light of later 
developments, especially Kepler’s work. However, as a physicist, he was truly conservative, 
true to the Aristotelian problematic. He hoisted his revolutionary mathematical problematic 
onto the Aristotelian problematic, creating an explosive, contradictory amalgam that would 
stamp the dynamic of physical science for the following millennium and a half. 
THE DILEMMAS AND DYNAMICS OF ARABIC PHYSICAL SCIENCE 
The problematic Arabic physical scientists inherited from the Greeks was an inhomogeneous, 
contradictory problematic. The principal contradiction was the multifaceted contradiction 
between the Ptolemaic mathematical apparatus and Aristotle’s physics. Arabic astronomers 
felt dissatisfied with Ptolemaic methods on account of this contradiction and some 
observational flaws they discovered in Ptolemy’s system. 
Basically, there were three main currents or traditions in Arabic astronomy: the observational 
(zij), the Shukuk tradition enunciated by Al-Hassan ibn Al-Haitharn, and the model-building 
tradition (Bitruji, Urdi, Tusi, Ibn Shatir). They all moved and produced ideas within the 
confines of the inherited problematic 21. In spite of their highly critical attitudes and 
creative talents, none ventured to move forward beyond it. The models the model-builders 
constructed fitted better in the edifice of the main Aristotelian problematic than Ptolemy’s 
models. All Arabic astronomers, including those belonging to the zij tradition, were acutely 
aware of the contradictory status of their problematic, and they tended to use their great 
mathematical skills to resolve those contradictions, guided by Aristotelian principles. 
In a sense, Arabic astronomers developed the conservative elements in the ancient 
problematic at the expense of the revolutionary elements; Aristotle at the expense of Ptolemy. 
They evidently opted for the conservative route of development. Their efforts were directed 
at taming the rebellious elements in Ptolemy. Ibn Al-Haitham’s Shukuk found their On the theoretical problematic of Arabic physical science or why did Arabic science ... 
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consummation in the Maragha School; in Urdi’s, Tusi’s and Ibn Shatir’s models and 
mathematical innovations. Of course, they were unable to dispense completely with 
Ptolemy’s mathematical methods. So, they resorted to a selection process according to taste 
within the confines of Aristotelian principles. They all agreed on the necessity of dispensing 
with the most revolutionary element in Ptolemy– namely, the equant. As we know, Tusi was 
able to replace it with his famous “couple”. Ibn Shatir built models that were free from 
equants and eccentrics, but that contained deferents and epicycles, and he had to modify 
slightly Aristotle’s theory of the ether to justify that. It was as though Arabic astronomers 
used all their mathematical ingenuity and genius to save the Greek problematic from its own 
contradictions. Their ideal was to create purely Aristotelian planetary models that accorded 
well with the observations. The purest Aristotelian system was built by Al-Bitruji in Andalus, 
but turned out to be inaccurate, compared with Ptolemy’s 22. Thus, Arabic astronomers had 
no choice but to retain some Ptolemaic elements. 
If we compare ancient astronomy to physics at the end of the 19
th century, we could 
characterize the situation as follows: Ptolemy was the Planck of ancient astronomy, Arabic 
astronomers were its Lorentz, whilst Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler were its Einstein. 
The pivotal questioning thet would explode the ancient problematic along the revolutionary 
route was, of course, that related to the Earth-centered hypothesis. Copernicus readily 
adopted the solutions that had been offered by Arabic astronomers, because they satisfied his 
Platonic aesthetic taste. In this, he was as conservative as Arabic scientists. However, he 
differed from them in being a Platonist, rather than an Aristotelian 23, 24. That must have 
facilitated his heliocentric revolution. It was indeed a revolution, because it challenged the 
whole Aristotelian edifice, and pointed towards a new, field, physics – modern physics. Thus, 
both Arabic astronomers and their European counterparts used physics to guide their 
astronomical practice. However, whereas the former tended to stick to Aristotelian physics in 
this endeavor, the latter tended to challenge it and use rudiments and instruments of a new, 
field, physics to guide their model-building. In particular, Kepler used a field physical model, 
inspired by Gilbert’s magnetic force model, to investigate the way the sun influenced the 
motion of the planets, and that played a crucial role in arriving at his laws of planetary 
motion. In fact, it enabled him to discover the revolutionary content of the Ptolemaic equant – 
the fact that it was a first approximation of an elliptical orbit 25. Thus, unlike Arabic 
astronomers, who had rejected the equant and retained the epicycle, he opted for the former 
and rejected the latter. He proved to be the ultimate embodiment of the revolutionary route. 
The preceding analysis inevitably raises the following questions: Why did Arabic 
astronomers follow the conservative Lorentzian route, despite their acute critical acumen and 
brilliant creative mathematical skills? Why did the Copernican Revolution have to await a 
Renaissance Central European – or, more precisely, two such astronomers (Copernicus and 
Kepler)? Why did Arabic astronomers stick so stubbornly to Aristotelian physics, and felt so 
inimical towards the revolutionary elements in Ptolemy? 
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF ARABIC RATIONALISM 
It is our contention that Arabic theoretical astronomy was closely related to Arabic 
rationalism, which means that the fate of the former was organically tied to the fate of the 
latter. My thesis here is that Arabic rationalism, which had been adopted by the early Abbasid 
state, particularly during the reigns of Al-Mansour and Al-Ma’moun, was soon to come under 
fire from orthodox religious quarters 26. The ascendancy of this orthodoxy and the alliance 
it forged with the militarist feudalist Islamic state weakened Arabic rationalism, and placed it 
under constant siege. Eventually it was liquidated completely by this alliance. Its last bastion H. Ghassib 
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was Arabic astronomy. The rationalists felt constantly threatened by that inimical force. This 
explains why they stubbornly stuck to Aristotelian rationalism, and were reluctant to 
transcend it. The fact that the battle for rationalism was lost in Arabic civilization accounts 
for this stubborn adherence to Aristotelian physics as opposed to Ptolemaic innovations. 
Because Arabic rationalists were under siege in their last bastion, their chief task was to 
defend Aristotelian rationalism, and not to critique it. That also offers a partial explanation of 
why Arabic astronomy reached its zenith in the age of decline. 
Arabic rationalism declined and was eventually liquidated for various socio- cultural reasons, 
one of which was its failure to forge a compromise with religious dogma and to carve a niche 
for itself in the Islamic religious enterprise. It was a double failure, whereby each enterprise 
failed to accommodate itself to the other. In Europe, the exact opposite occurred. In spite of 
the initial hostile response of the Church to Aristotelian and Averroist rationalism 27, 28, 
eventually a historic compromise was reached between the two enterprises, and 
Aristotelianism was absorbed by Church dogma, thanks chiefly to the brilliant efforts of 
Thomas Aquinas. The fact that Aristotelian rationalism became part of the official dogma 
made it possible for later generations to critique it in the name of a higher rationalism. The 
consolidation of Aristotelian rationalism in European civilization was a precondition for its 
thorough critique in the name of a higher rationalism. This difference in attitude is best 
illustrated by contrasting Kepler’s attitude to Ptolemy’s equant with the late Arabic 
astronomers’ attitude to it. Arabic astronomers were vehement in rejecting this Ptolemaic 
device, because it contradicted Aristotelian physics, which was part of Aristotelian 
rationalism. Their strict normative adherence to this rationalism drove them to view the 
equant as an irrational element in Ptolemaic astronomy. Of course, Copernicus was to follow 
suit. On the other hand, Kepler was to reject the Ptolemaic epicycle and rehabilitate the 
Ptolemaic equant in the name of a new, burgeoning, physics and rationality. The triumph of 
Aristotelian rationalism in medieval Europe was a prelude to its later demise and its 
replacement by a new rationalism, what I call scientific rationalism. On the other hand, its 
defeat in Arabic medieval civilization was an impediment to transcending it towards a new 
science and a new rationalism. It was a prelude to the eclipse of rationalism as such in Arabic 
civilization. 
The besieged status of Aristotelian rationalism drove Arabic astronomers to seek solutions to 
the problems of theoretical Arabic astronomy within the confines of Aristotelian physics and 
cosmology, just as Lorentz later did with respect to classical electrodynamics 29. The 
consolidation of Aristotelian rationalism in Arabic civilization would have been a necessary 
precondition for its transcendence towards modern scientific rationalism – i.e., for the 
Copernicus-Kepler astronomical revolution to occur in the Arabic middle ages. 
METAPHYSICAL RATIONALISM VERSUS SCIENTIFIC RATIONALISM 
To understand the significance of this contrast and the associated intellectual processes, we 
need to understand the distinguishing features of both the antique rationalism, i.e. the 
rationalism that prevailed in both Greek and Arabic antiquity – and the modern rationalism, 
which has prevailed since the scientific revolution (1543-1687). 
I call antique rationalism metaphysical rationalism. In Arabic civilization, this rationalism 
existed in quite a few forms: Aristotelian or Peripatetic, Platonic, Neo-Platonic (Plotinus) and 
Kalamic (both Mu’tazilite and Ash’arite). These rationalist forms were combined with 
various forms of irrational currents, such as Pythagoreanism, mysticism, astrology, alchemy, 
magic, oriental creeds, Gnosticism and hermeticism 30. This rationalism reached its apex in 
Aristotelian rationalism and, in particular, in Ibn Rushd 31. In Aristotelian rationalism, On the theoretical problematic of Arabic physical science or why did Arabic science ... 
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there were two sources of certainty: pure reason and the raw senses. A set of metaphysical 
principles were derived from pure reason, and considered solid bases of certain knowledge, 
on the one hand, and the world of sense was taken uncritically for granted, on the other. The 
essence of Aristotelian physics lay in emphasizing nature related metaphysical principles, 
and, then, saving the phenomena with them. Attempts were made to account for the raw 
phenomena of the world of the senses in terms of these metaphysical principles via formal 
logic and the syllogism. The latter was the bridge between metaphysics and the senses. The 
world of metaphysical principles and the world of the senses were related via the syllogism. 
That was the essence of Aristotelian methodology and metaphysical rationalism. 
A new rationalism was to arise during the 17
th century – scientific rationalism. Whereas 
Arabic astronomers and physicists failed to transcend metaphysical rationalism to scientific 
rationalism, conditions were ripe for 17
th century European scientists to do that. Basing our 
conclusions on a thorough study of the 17
th century scientific revolution, we outline here 
some of the distinguishing features of scientific rationalism 32: 
1.  The relationship between philosophy and science was inverted. Instead of science being 
appended to metaphysics, generally speaking, metaphysics and philosophy became 
appended to science. Instead of philosophy guiding science, from then on, science 
would guide philosophy. 
2.  Whereas antique science focused on the actual as revealed by the senses, and in the light 
of the metaphysical abstract, modern science would focus on the potential, the possible, 
the mathematically amenable abstract. Whereas the former tried to find out how first 
(metaphysical) principles produced raw phenomena, modern science would try to 
discover the mathematical principles followed by the potential and possible. The latter 
would then dialectically fuse these principles together and universalize them to arrive at 
deeper material causal principles. In short, mathematical deduction and dialectical 
synthesis have replaced the syllogism, on the one hand, and material causes have 
replaced first principles and metaphysical causes, on the other 
3.  In antique science, philosophy was endowed with the function of producing knowledge. 
It was a necessary tool of knowledge production. In modern knowledge production, it 
has lost this function, and the latter has been replaced by the function of transcendentally 
grounding scientific practice, and other practices as well. 
4.  Science has become autonomous. In particular, it has gained its independence of 
theology, philosophy, the crafts and political authority. Scientific reason has become an 
authority unto itself. 
5.  Notwithstanding quantum mechanics, modern science presupposes the ideas of the 
materiality and infinitude of the world. It also presupposes that causes are internal to the 
Universe, and a new causality based on material interactions between material 
components. 
6.  In modern science, the world of the senses is no more a source of certainty. It is not 
considered entirely objective, but partly subjectively constituted. The senses are basically 
defective measuring instruments. Knowledge needs more accurate and precise measuring 
instruments. These are furnished, not by the senses, but by scientific reason, which is, 
thus, the eye of truth and our probe of reality. Modern science presupposes the existence 
of primary and secondary qualities and properties, i.e. it presupposes the dichotomy of 
appearance and reality. 
7.  Modern knowledge is mathematically structured. This means that it is axiomatically 
based. It presupposes a set of axioms. However, scientific axioms are not absolute, but 
relative and conditional. They are testable and studied presuppositions. They are H. Ghassib 
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constantly under scrutiny and constantly tested via their deductive consequences. They 
are always provisional. In metaphysical rationalism, on the other hand, axioms have an 
absolute and sacred character. 
8.  The mathematical experimental essence of scientific rationalism imposes a set of etical 
norms on scientific practice, which is alien to metaphysical rationalism. 
9.  Modern science and rationalism are essentially absolutely critical, dialectical, unifying, 
materialist and causal in the materialist sense. Metaphysical rationalism tended to be 
dogmatic, formally syllogistic, fragmenting, idealist and causal in the theological sense. 
10.  The animating principle of scientific practice and rationalism is scientific reason. Science 
has no reference point save scientific reason. The animating principle of metaphysical 
rationalism was transcendental reasoning. 
CONCLUSION 
I hegelianized Althusser’s concept of problematic, and applied it to Arabic astronomy, to 
uncover the underlying unity of that science. It was shown that Arabic astronomers chose to 
follow the conservative route of development similarly to Lorentz, unlike Kepler who 
followed the revolutionary route similarly to Einstein. An explanation is offerred why that 
occurred, in terms of a contrast we have detailed between metaphysical rationalism and 
scientific rationalism. 
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ZNANOSTI, ILI ZAŠTO ARAPSKA ZNANOST NIJE 
OSTVARILA KOPERNIKANSKU REVOLUCIJU 
H. Ghassib
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SAŽETAK 
Hegelovska verzija Althusserovog koncepta problematike upotrijebljena je za istraživanje teorijskog jedinstva i 
strukture u podlozi arapskih fizičkih znanosti (fizike, astronomije i kemije). Kontradiktorna trijada (povezana s 
platonizmom, aristotelijanizmom i ptolomeizmom) uočena je u središtu arapskih fizičkih znanosti. Ovaj rad 
fokusira se na smionim pokušajima vodećih arapskih znanstvenika da razriješe te kontradikcije bez nadilaženja 
ili ukidanja pretežne problematike. Zatim je postavljeno sljedeće pitanje: zašto je arapska fizika bila 
reformistička, umjesto da bude revolucionarna kao fizičke znanosti renesansne Europe? Odgovor je predložen u 
terminima povijesti, prirode i pada arapskog racionalizma. 
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